Because nobody knows and our knowledge is fallible. We are committed to realizing and exploring that amidst a culture that clings to certainty
The fragmented conceptual models that constitute much of psychopathological theory–and that inform related discourse about said disorders–, seem to prescribe a bounded solution set to a ‘problem’ that the very discourse itself, produces. In characterizing these problems in such a categorical way–steeped in assumptions about the existence of binaries across and within the domains to which said problem “belongs”–we do little to help ourselves by failing to see the more fundamental biophysical-phenomenological mechanisms of co-emergence that may be in play at every level of analysis that, taken holistically, constitutes the ‘problem state’. This is roughly the point that ‘integrated medicine’ as a specialty seeks to address. However, even integrated or functional medicine practitioners still embolden an orientation toward epistemology that is maladaptive if and when they are keen to reify the legitimacy of their own orientations, at the definitive exclusion of all other approaches, and without scientific or theoretical justification to back such assertions. The fundamental nature of our suffering seems anything but clear; however, a tradition of explanatory reductionism (wherever you look in healthcare, be that your mainstream “western medicine”, your “integrative medicine”, your “natural medicine” etc.) appears to have normalized a clinical discourse that creates this illusion of explanatory depth: we mistakenly believe that medical professionals understand a complex mechanism of action by which some structures and processes result in eventual disease. Many people today–practitioners, clients, and the broader public–uncritically accept and conflate these explanatory, pathological ‘maps’ with their ‘territories’ because many are happy to believe in the sentiment that somebody–some entity–understands the nature of their problems; and by association, the nature of their “solutions”.
In order to get a sense of whether or not this sentiment is based in reality, it may be helpful to take a look at some patterns that we are seeing in practice. With respect to matters of the mind, we largely see treatment inefficacy, perpetuation of disorder, certain kinds of injustices and other harms, attrition and barriers to engagement, power imbalances, risk deflection, blame, rising costs, etc. To be clear, we think that this reflects a significant failure. Moreover, we feel that the failure is a responsibility of all of us. We also do not intend to imply that the scientific knowledge and psychophysiological tools that have been developed thus far are useless; these technologies are deeply valued and utilized by some people in some situations. However, there has been appalling stagnation in this space–particularly with respect to disorders marked by chronic cognitive disorganization, perceptual anomalies, altered states of consciousness, the inability to selectively attend to sensory information, psychosis, etc–since the 60s!!! (. In addition to this alarming stagnation, a fundamental part of the problem relates to the socio-structural features of healthcare: the stifling, overwrought, inflexible ecology that we call ‘the mental health system’ renders clients unable to easily access those potentially useful technologies that do exist, in an autonomous, self-dignified way. This system design, we argue, just reinforces paternalism, blame, and organizational risk deflection (as opposed to autonomy, symmetrical risk sharing, and inter-relational collaboration, respectively). The failure of the institutional practice of psychiatry and the allied health professions (and really healthcare writ large) warrants immediate attention and action from all stakeholders involved. **We focus here on the failure of the practice as opposed to theoretical or explanatory endeavors because we a) are skeptical of the feasibility of establishing causal models for such dynamic disorders b) find this body of knowledge to only be of value insofar as it has implications for methods/technologies that could be developed in order to ultimately be applied in practice (hopefully effectively).
It is also important to reflect upon the way (the methods or techniques) in which we represent and discuss information in medicine (and all of science). The language and other signaling that we use, implicitly reflects our judgments about, and epistemic orientations toward, the theories to which we subscribe. Much of ‘psychiatry’ as we know it, seems flawed not only in practice, but in many of the conceptual assumptions (and ways of thinking or not thinking about these assumptions) upon which it is inspired.
When we buy into theoretical frameworks with an epistemic attitude of certainty and arrogance, it is likely that we cause more harm than if we were to subscribe to those same theoretical frameworks with an epistemic attitude of ambiguity and openness. In the latter scheme, we essentially mostly think that a conceptual assumption, claim, or principle is a reasonable prior, but we hold this view with a constant awareness of its potential fallibility . We’re not married to our ideas. We’re always open and always ready to prioritize or de-prioritize these ideas in lock-step with incoming information. As “professionals”, when we believe that consumer stakeholders are of “lower epistemic status, perhaps we will “consult” (i.e. feign interest in their opinions, while rarely actually listening). In most cases they alone get the last word. They have most decision making power: from problem formulation, to ‘treatment’ practices, to research scope and design, to policy decisions, etc. This inherently undermines progress. It is these very paternalistic, asymmetrical epistemic attitudes that perpetuate the relational injustices that mediate part of the problem in the first place.
Recently, many psychosocial researcher-practitioners have touted “community-based participatory research” (CBPR) as an innovative and inclusive methodology for addressing stakeholder equity and engagement in this space; however, I question if this way of relating and working together really fundamentally changes epistemic hierarchies and decision making powers . Is it really a new wine or just a new wine bottle?
We suspect that in order to sustainably address the limitations endemic to academic research and professional practice, we need to reflect upon and adapt our ways of relating and practicing such that they function to lessen epistemic injustices and power imbalances within and across all interactions so that we can optimize our collective capacities to integrate information and create better solutions.
Borsboom, Denny, Angélique O. J. Cramer, and Annemarie Kalis. 2019. “Brain Disorders? Not Really: Why Network Structures Block Reductionism in Psychopathology Research.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42: e2. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17002266. Cite
@article{borsboom_brain_2019,
title = {Brain disorders? {Not} really: {Why} network structures block reductionism in psychopathology research},
volume = {42},
issn = {0140-525X, 1469-1825},
shorttitle = {Brain disorders?},
url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0140525X17002266/type/journal_article},
doi = {10.1017/S0140525X17002266},
abstract = {In the past decades, reductionism has dominated both research directions and funding policies in clinical psychology and psychiatry. The intense search for the biological basis of mental disorders, however, has not resulted in conclusive reductionist explanations of psychopathology. Recently, network models have been proposed as an alternative framework for the analysis of mental disorders, in which mental disorders arise from the causal interplay between symptoms. In this target article, we show that this conceptualization can help explain why reductionist approaches in psychiatry and clinical psychology are on the wrong track. First, symptom networks preclude the identification of a common cause of symptomatology with a neurobiological condition; in symptom networks, there is no such common cause. Second, symptom network relations depend on the content of mental states and, as such, feature intentionality. Third, the strength of network relations is highly likely to depend partially on cultural and historical contexts as well as external mechanisms in the environment. Taken together, these properties suggest that, if mental disorders are indeed networks of causally related symptoms, reductionist accounts cannot achieve the level of success associated with reductionist disease models in modern medicine. As an alternative strategy, we propose to interpret network structures in terms of D. C. Dennett’s (1987) notion of real patterns, and suggest that, instead of being reducible to a biological basis, mental disorders feature biological and psychological factors that are deeply intertwined in feedback loops. This suggests that neither psychological nor biological levels can claim causal or explanatory priority, and that a holistic research strategy is necessary for progress in the study of mental disorders.},
language = {en},
urldate = {2020-07-06},
journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
author = {Borsboom, Denny and Cramer, Angélique O. J. and Kalis, Annemarie},
year = {2019},
note = {ZSCC: 0000103},
pages = {e2}
}
In the past decades, reductionism has dominated both research directions and funding policies in clinical psychology and psychiatry. The intense search for the biological basis of mental disorders, however, has not resulted in conclusive reductionist explanations of psychopathology. Recently, network models have been proposed as an alternative framework for the analysis of mental disorders, in which mental disorders arise from the causal interplay between symptoms. In this target article, we show that this conceptualization can help explain why reductionist approaches in psychiatry and clinical psychology are on the wrong track. First, symptom networks preclude the identification of a common cause of symptomatology with a neurobiological condition; in symptom networks, there is no such common cause. Second, symptom network relations depend on the content of mental states and, as such, feature intentionality. Third, the strength of network relations is highly likely to depend partially on cultural and historical contexts as well as external mechanisms in the environment. Taken together, these properties suggest that, if mental disorders are indeed networks of causally related symptoms, reductionist accounts cannot achieve the level of success associated with reductionist disease models in modern medicine. As an alternative strategy, we propose to interpret network structures in terms of D. C. Dennett’s (1987) notion of real patterns, and suggest that, instead of being reducible to a biological basis, mental disorders feature biological and psychological factors that are deeply intertwined in feedback loops. This suggests that neither psychological nor biological levels can claim causal or explanatory priority, and that a holistic research strategy is necessary for progress in the study of mental disorders.
@article{borsboom_network_2017,
title = {A network theory of mental disorders},
volume = {16},
issn = {2051-5545},
url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/wps.20375},
doi = {10.1002/wps.20375},
abstract = {In recent years, the network approach to psychopathology has been advanced as an alternative way of conceptualizing mental disorders. In this approach, mental disorders arise from direct interactions between symptoms. Although the network approach has led to many novel methodologies and substantive applications, it has not yet been fully articulated as a scientific theory of mental disorders. The present paper aims to develop such a theory, by postulating a limited set of theoretical principles regarding the structure and dynamics of symptom networks. At the heart of the theory lies the notion that symptoms of psychopathology are causally connected through myriads of biological, psychological and societal mechanisms. If these causal relations are sufficiently strong, symptoms can generate a level of feedback that renders them self-sustaining. In this case, the network can get stuck in a disorder state. The network theory holds that this is a general feature of mental disorders, which can therefore be understood as alternative stable states of strongly connected symptom networks. This idea naturally leads to a comprehensive model of psychopathology, encompassing a common explanatory model for mental disorders, as well as novel definitions of associated concepts such as mental health, resilience, vulnerability and liability. In addition, the network theory has direct implications for how to understand diagnosis and treatment, and suggests a clear agenda for future research in psychiatry and associated disciplines.},
language = {en},
number = {1},
urldate = {2020-10-13},
journal = {World Psychiatry},
author = {Borsboom, Denny},
year = {2017},
note = {ZSCC: 0000706
\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/wps.20375},
keywords = {Psychopathology, diagnosis, mental disorders, mental health, network approach, resilience, symptom networks, treatment, vulnerability},
pages = {5--13}
}
In recent years, the network approach to psychopathology has been advanced as an alternative way of conceptualizing mental disorders. In this approach, mental disorders arise from direct interactions between symptoms. Although the network approach has led to many novel methodologies and substantive applications, it has not yet been fully articulated as a scientific theory of mental disorders. The present paper aims to develop such a theory, by postulating a limited set of theoretical principles regarding the structure and dynamics of symptom networks. At the heart of the theory lies the notion that symptoms of psychopathology are causally connected through myriads of biological, psychological and societal mechanisms. If these causal relations are sufficiently strong, symptoms can generate a level of feedback that renders them self-sustaining. In this case, the network can get stuck in a disorder state. The network theory holds that this is a general feature of mental disorders, which can therefore be understood as alternative stable states of strongly connected symptom networks. This idea naturally leads to a comprehensive model of psychopathology, encompassing a common explanatory model for mental disorders, as well as novel definitions of associated concepts such as mental health, resilience, vulnerability and liability. In addition, the network theory has direct implications for how to understand diagnosis and treatment, and suggests a clear agenda for future research in psychiatry and associated disciplines.
@article{noauthor_cultivating_2017,
title = {Cultivating {Humility} and {Diagnostic} {Openness} in {Clinical} {Judgment}},
volume = {19},
issn = {2376-6980},
url = {https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/cultivating-humility-and-diagnostic-openness-clinical-judgment/2017-10},
doi = {10.1001/journalofethics.2017.19.10.ecas1-1710},
abstract = {In this case, a physician rejects a patient’s concerns that tainted water is harming the patient and her community. Stereotypes and biases regarding socioeconomic class and race/ethnicity, constraining diagnostic frameworks, and fixed first impressions could skew the physician’s judgment. This paper narratively illustrates how cultivating humility could help the physician truly hear the patient’s suggestions. The discussion builds on the multifaceted concept of cultural humility as a lifelong journey that addresses not only stereotypes and biases but also power inequalities and community inequities. Insurgent multiculturalism is a complementary concept. Through epistemic humility—which includes both intellectual and emotional components—and admitting uncertainty, physicians can enhance patients’ and families’ epistemic authority and health agency.},
language = {en},
number = {10},
urldate = {2020-03-20},
journal = {AMA Journal of Ethics},
month = oct,
year = {2017},
pages = {970--977}
}
In this case, a physician rejects a patient’s concerns that tainted water is harming the patient and her community. Stereotypes and biases regarding socioeconomic class and race/ethnicity, constraining diagnostic frameworks, and fixed first impressions could skew the physician’s judgment. This paper narratively illustrates how cultivating humility could help the physician truly hear the patient’s suggestions. The discussion builds on the multifaceted concept of cultural humility as a lifelong journey that addresses not only stereotypes and biases but also power inequalities and community inequities. Insurgent multiculturalism is a complementary concept. Through epistemic humility—which includes both intellectual and emotional components—and admitting uncertainty, physicians can enhance patients’ and families’ epistemic authority and health agency.
@article{whooley_nosological_2014,
title = {Nosological {Reflections}: {The} {Failure} of \textit{{DSM}} -5, the {Emergence} of {RDoC}, and the {Decontextualization} of {Mental} {Distress}},
volume = {4},
issn = {2156-8693, 2156-8731},
shorttitle = {Nosological {Reflections}},
url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2156869313519114},
doi = {10.1177/2156869313519114},
abstract = {Since the establishment of the symptoms-based categories in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), Third Edition, sociologists have raised concerns about the DSM’s failure to appreciate social, contextual factors when defining mental disorders. The author describes recent developments in psychiatric nosology—the DSM-5 revision process and the emergence of the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC)—and then considers their implications for decontextualization. Drawing on in-depth interviews with psychiatrists involved in the DSM-5 controversy and a content analysis of key documents, the author first recounts the ambitious DSM-5 revisions, illuminating the DSM-5 Task Force’s embrace of dimensionalization as a solution to the problem of validity and the ultimate rejection of this ‘‘paradigm shift’’ by psychiatrists. The Task Force’s failures prompted the National Institute of Mental Health to promote RDoC as an alternative nosological framework that eschews DSM categories altogether. Next, the author explores the ramifications of these events for decontextualization, which neither DSM-5 nor RDoC explicitly addresses, demonstrating how RDoC is poised to escalate decontextualization through its brain-centric conceptualization of mental disorders. To counteract these developments, sociologists should continue to promote ways of defining mental distress that underscore its social embeddedness.},
language = {en},
number = {2},
urldate = {2020-03-18},
journal = {Society and Mental Health},
author = {Whooley, Owen},
month = jul,
year = {2014},
pages = {92--110}
}
Since the establishment of the symptoms-based categories in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), Third Edition, sociologists have raised concerns about the DSM’s failure to appreciate social, contextual factors when defining mental disorders. The author describes recent developments in psychiatric nosology—the DSM-5 revision process and the emergence of the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC)—and then considers their implications for decontextualization. Drawing on in-depth interviews with psychiatrists involved in the DSM-5 controversy and a content analysis of key documents, the author first recounts the ambitious DSM-5 revisions, illuminating the DSM-5 Task Force’s embrace of dimensionalization as a solution to the problem of validity and the ultimate rejection of this ‘‘paradigm shift’’ by psychiatrists. The Task Force’s failures prompted the National Institute of Mental Health to promote RDoC as an alternative nosological framework that eschews DSM categories altogether. Next, the author explores the ramifications of these events for decontextualization, which neither DSM-5 nor RDoC explicitly addresses, demonstrating how RDoC is poised to escalate decontextualization through its brain-centric conceptualization of mental disorders. To counteract these developments, sociologists should continue to promote ways of defining mental distress that underscore its social embeddedness.
@article{kvaale_side_2013,
title = {The ‘side effects’ of medicalization: {A} meta-analytic review of how biogenetic explanations affect stigma},
volume = {33},
issn = {02727358},
shorttitle = {The ‘side effects’ of medicalization},
url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0272735813000883},
doi = {10.1016/j.cpr.2013.06.002},
abstract = {Reducing stigma is crucial for facilitating recovery from psychological problems. Viewing these problems biomedically may reduce the tendency to blame affected persons, but critics have cautioned that it could also increase other facets of stigma. We report on the first meta-analytic review of the effects of biogenetic explanations on stigma. A comprehensive search yielded 28 eligible experimental studies. Four separate meta-analyses (Ns = 1207–3469) assessed the effects of biogenetic explanations on blame, perceived dangerousness, social distance, and prognostic pessimism. We found that biogenetic explanations reduce blame (Hedges g = − 0.324) but induce pessimism (Hedges g = 0.263). We also found that biogenetic explanations increase endorsement of the stereotype that people with psychological problems are dangerous (Hedges g = 0.198), although this result could reflect publication bias. Finally, we found that biogenetic explanations do not typically affect social distance. Promoting biogenetic explanations to alleviate blame may induce pessimism and set the stage for self-fulfilling prophecies that could hamper recovery from psychological problems.},
language = {en},
number = {6},
urldate = {2020-04-02},
journal = {Clinical Psychology Review},
author = {Kvaale, Erlend P. and Haslam, Nick and Gottdiener, William H.},
month = aug,
year = {2013},
note = {ZSCC: 0000286},
pages = {782--794}
}
Reducing stigma is crucial for facilitating recovery from psychological problems. Viewing these problems biomedically may reduce the tendency to blame affected persons, but critics have cautioned that it could also increase other facets of stigma. We report on the first meta-analytic review of the effects of biogenetic explanations on stigma. A comprehensive search yielded 28 eligible experimental studies. Four separate meta-analyses (Ns = 1207–3469) assessed the effects of biogenetic explanations on blame, perceived dangerousness, social distance, and prognostic pessimism. We found that biogenetic explanations reduce blame (Hedges g = − 0.324) but induce pessimism (Hedges g = 0.263). We also found that biogenetic explanations increase endorsement of the stereotype that people with psychological problems are dangerous (Hedges g = 0.198), although this result could reflect publication bias. Finally, we found that biogenetic explanations do not typically affect social distance. Promoting biogenetic explanations to alleviate blame may induce pessimism and set the stage for self-fulfilling prophecies that could hamper recovery from psychological problems.
@article{schwab_epistemic_2012,
title = {Epistemic {Humility} and {Medical} {Practice}: {Translating} {Epistemic} {Categories} into {Ethical} {Obligations}},
volume = {37},
issn = {0360-5310, 1744-5019},
shorttitle = {Epistemic {Humility} and {Medical} {Practice}},
url = {https://academic.oup.com/jmp/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/jmp/jhr054},
doi = {10.1093/jmp/jhr054},
abstract = {Physicians and other medical practitioners make untold numbers of judgments about patient care on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis. These judgments fall along a number of spectrums, from the mundane to the tragic, from the obvious to the challenging. Under the rubric of evidence-based medicine, these judgments will be informed by the robust conclusions of medical research. In the ideal circumstance medical research makes the best decision obvious to the trained professional. Even when practice approximates this ideal, it does so unevenly. Judgments in medical practice are always accompanied by uncertainty, and this uncertainty is a fickle companion—constant in its presence but inconstant in its expression. This feature of medical judgments gives rise to the moral responsibility of medical practitioners to be epistemically humble. This requires the recognition and communication of the uncertainty that accompanies their judgment as well as a commitment to avoiding intuitive innovations.},
language = {en},
number = {1},
urldate = {2020-07-01},
journal = {Journal of Medicine and Philosophy},
author = {Schwab, A.},
month = feb,
year = {2012},
note = {ZSCC: 0000031},
pages = {28--48}
}
Physicians and other medical practitioners make untold numbers of judgments about patient care on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis. These judgments fall along a number of spectrums, from the mundane to the tragic, from the obvious to the challenging. Under the rubric of evidence-based medicine, these judgments will be informed by the robust conclusions of medical research. In the ideal circumstance medical research makes the best decision obvious to the trained professional. Even when practice approximates this ideal, it does so unevenly. Judgments in medical practice are always accompanied by uncertainty, and this uncertainty is a fickle companion—constant in its presence but inconstant in its expression. This feature of medical judgments gives rise to the moral responsibility of medical practitioners to be epistemically humble. This requires the recognition and communication of the uncertainty that accompanies their judgment as well as a commitment to avoiding intuitive innovations.
@article{thomas_anomalies_2012,
title = {The anomalies of evidence‐based medicine in psychiatry: time to rethink the basis of mental health practice},
volume = {17},
issn = {1361-9322},
shorttitle = {The anomalies of evidence‐based medicine in psychiatry},
url = {https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/13619321211287265/full/html},
doi = {10.1108/13619321211287265},
abstract = {Purpose – Evidence-based medicine (EBM) is a technical and scientific paradigm in clinical practice that has delivered major improvements in the outcome of care in medicine and surgery. However, its value in psychiatry is much less clear. The purpose of the paper is thus to examine its value by subjecting empirical evidence from EBM to a conceptual analysis using the philosophy of Thomas Kuhn. Design/methodology/approach – The authors examine evidence drawn from meta-analyses of RCTs investigating the efficacy of specific treatments for depression in the form of antidepressant drugs and CBT. This shows that the non-specific aspects of treatment, the placebo effect and the quality of the therapeutic alliance as seen by the patient, are more important in determining outcome than the specific elements (active drug, specific therapeutic elements of CBT).},
language = {en},
number = {3},
urldate = {2020-03-18},
journal = {Mental Health Review Journal},
author = {Thomas, Philip and Bracken, Pat and Timimi, Sami},
month = sep,
year = {2012},
keywords = {clinical medicine, depression, evidence-based medicine, mental illness, recovery},
pages = {152--162}
}
Purpose – Evidence-based medicine (EBM) is a technical and scientific paradigm in clinical practice that has delivered major improvements in the outcome of care in medicine and surgery. However, its value in psychiatry is much less clear. The purpose of the paper is thus to examine its value by subjecting empirical evidence from EBM to a conceptual analysis using the philosophy of Thomas Kuhn. Design/methodology/approach – The authors examine evidence drawn from meta-analyses of RCTs investigating the efficacy of specific treatments for depression in the form of antidepressant drugs and CBT. This shows that the non-specific aspects of treatment, the placebo effect and the quality of the therapeutic alliance as seen by the patient, are more important in determining outcome than the specific elements (active drug, specific therapeutic elements of CBT).
@article{de_vreese_explanatory_2010,
title = {Explanatory pluralism in the medical sciences: {Theory} and practice},
volume = {31},
issn = {1386-7415, 1573-1200},
shorttitle = {Explanatory pluralism in the medical sciences},
url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11017-010-9156-7},
doi = {10.1007/s11017-010-9156-7},
abstract = {Explanatory pluralism is the view that the best form and level of explanation depends on the kind of question one seeks to answer by the explanation, and that in order to answer all questions in the best way possible, we need more than one form and level of explanation. In the first part of this article, we argue that explanatory pluralism holds for the medical sciences, at least in theory. However, in the second part of the article we show that medical research and practice is actually not fully and truly explanatory pluralist yet. Although the literature demonstrates a slowly growing interest in non-reductive explanations in medicine, the dominant approach in medicine is still methodologically reductionist. This implies that non-reductive explanations often do not get the attention they deserve. We argue that the field of medicine could benefit greatly by reconsidering its reductive tendencies and becoming fully and truly explanatory pluralist. Nonetheless, trying to achieve the right balance in the search for and application of reductive and non-reductive explanations will in any case be a difficult exercise.},
language = {en},
number = {5},
urldate = {2020-03-18},
journal = {Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics},
author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen},
month = oct,
year = {2010},
pages = {371--390}
}
Explanatory pluralism is the view that the best form and level of explanation depends on the kind of question one seeks to answer by the explanation, and that in order to answer all questions in the best way possible, we need more than one form and level of explanation. In the first part of this article, we argue that explanatory pluralism holds for the medical sciences, at least in theory. However, in the second part of the article we show that medical research and practice is actually not fully and truly explanatory pluralist yet. Although the literature demonstrates a slowly growing interest in non-reductive explanations in medicine, the dominant approach in medicine is still methodologically reductionist. This implies that non-reductive explanations often do not get the attention they deserve. We argue that the field of medicine could benefit greatly by reconsidering its reductive tendencies and becoming fully and truly explanatory pluralist. Nonetheless, trying to achieve the right balance in the search for and application of reductive and non-reductive explanations will in any case be a difficult exercise.
@article{weisberg_seductive_2008,
title = {The {Seductive} {Allure} of {Neuroscience} {Explanations}},
volume = {20},
issn = {0898-929X},
url = {https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2778755/},
doi = {10.1162/jocn.2008.20040},
abstract = {Explanations of psychological phenomena seem to generate more public interest when they contain neuroscientific information. Even irrelevant neuroscience information in an explanation of a psychological phenomenon may interfere with people’s abilities to critically consider the underlying logic of this explanation. We tested this hypothesis by giving naïve adults, students in a neuroscience course, and neuroscience experts brief descriptions of psychological phenomena followed by one of four types of explanation, according to a 2 (good explanation vs. bad explanation) × 2 (without neuroscience vs. with neuroscience) design. Crucially, the neuroscience information was irrelevant to the logic of the explanation, as confirmed by the expert subjects. Subjects in all three groups judged good explanations as more satisfying than bad ones. But subjects in the two nonexpert groups additionally judged that explanations with logically irrelevant neuroscience information were more satisfying than explanations without. The neuroscience information had a particularly striking effect on nonexperts’ judgments of bad explanations, masking otherwise salient problems in these explanations.},
number = {3},
urldate = {2020-07-06},
journal = {Journal of cognitive neuroscience},
author = {Weisberg, Deena Skolnick and Keil, Frank C. and Goodstein, Joshua and Rawson, Elizabeth and Gray, Jeremy R.},
month = mar,
year = {2008},
pmid = {18004955},
pmcid = {PMC2778755},
note = {ZSCC: 0001112 },
pages = {470--477}
}
Explanations of psychological phenomena seem to generate more public interest when they contain neuroscientific information. Even irrelevant neuroscience information in an explanation of a psychological phenomenon may interfere with people’s abilities to critically consider the underlying logic of this explanation. We tested this hypothesis by giving naïve adults, students in a neuroscience course, and neuroscience experts brief descriptions of psychological phenomena followed by one of four types of explanation, according to a 2 (good explanation vs. bad explanation) × 2 (without neuroscience vs. with neuroscience) design. Crucially, the neuroscience information was irrelevant to the logic of the explanation, as confirmed by the expert subjects. Subjects in all three groups judged good explanations as more satisfying than bad ones. But subjects in the two nonexpert groups additionally judged that explanations with logically irrelevant neuroscience information were more satisfying than explanations without. The neuroscience information had a particularly striking effect on nonexperts’ judgments of bad explanations, masking otherwise salient problems in these explanations.
@article{bracken_szasz_nodate,
title = {From {Szasz} to {Foucault}: {On} the {Role} of {Critical} {Psychiatry}},
abstract = {In this article, we examine the different ways in which Thomas Szasz and Michel Foucault have challenged dominant perspectives within psychiatry. We identify, analyze, and compare the central elements of their respective discourses on psychiatry and show that although they are often bracketed together, in fact there are certain fundamental differences between Szasz and Foucault. Of most importance is their contrasting ways of characterizing the nature and role of critical thought. Whereas Szasz’s analysis is predicated on a number of binary distinctions, Foucault works to overcome such distinctions. In the past ten years, a new movement of critical psychiatry has emerged. Although this shares certain concerns with the critical psychiatry of the 1960s and 1970s, there are substantial differences. We argue that this discourse is more resonant with the Foucauldian approach.},
language = {en},
author = {Bracken, Pat and Thomas, Philip},
note = {ZSCC: 0000082},
pages = {11}
}
In this article, we examine the different ways in which Thomas Szasz and Michel Foucault have challenged dominant perspectives within psychiatry. We identify, analyze, and compare the central elements of their respective discourses on psychiatry and show that although they are often bracketed together, in fact there are certain fundamental differences between Szasz and Foucault. Of most importance is their contrasting ways of characterizing the nature and role of critical thought. Whereas Szasz’s analysis is predicated on a number of binary distinctions, Foucault works to overcome such distinctions. In the past ten years, a new movement of critical psychiatry has emerged. Although this shares certain concerns with the critical psychiatry of the 1960s and 1970s, there are substantial differences. We argue that this discourse is more resonant with the Foucauldian approach.
@article{boisvert_iatrogenic_nodate,
title = {Iatrogenic {Symptoms} in {Psychotherapy} {A} {Theoretical} {Exploration} of the {Potential} {Impact} of {Labels}, {Language}, and {Belief} {Systems}},
language = {en},
journal = {AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOTHERAPY},
author = {Boisvert, Charles M},
note = {ZSCC: 0000072},
pages = {16}
}
![Conceptual Competence in Psychiatry: Recommendations for Education and Training [link]](http://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "Paper")
